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Asymmetries and Incentives in Plea Bargaining and
Evidence Production
abstract. Legal rules severely restrict payments to fact witnesses, though the government
can often offer plea bargains or other nonmonetary inducements to encourage testimony. This
asymmetry is something of a puzzle, for most asymmetries in criminal law favor the defendant.
The asymmetry seems to disappear when physical evidence is at issue. One goal of this Essay is
to understand the distinctions, or asymmetries, between monetary and nonmonetary payments,
testimonial and physical evidence, and payments by the prosecution and defense. Another is to
suggest ways in which law could better encourage the production of evidence, and thus the
efficient reduction of crime, with a relaxation of the rule barring payment.
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introduction
The law of evidence is full of puzzles. Many of these revolve around
admissibility and, more narrowly, the rules forbidding or restricting payment
to a fact witness.1 Presumably, the dangers of self-interest and perjury are
thought to dominate the benefits normally associated with remuneration for
hard work. At the same time, the government—but not the defense—is able to
reward witnesses in criminal cases with certain nonmonetary inducements,
including agreements to seek reduced penalties, or even not to prosecute at all
in both related and unrelated cases.2 If a witness is already incarcerated, the

1.

2.
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See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4 (2010) (“A lawyer shall not . . . falsify
evidence, counsel or assist a witness to testify falsely, or offer an inducement to a witness
that is prohibited by law . . . .”). The comment to Rule 3.4(b) states:
[I]t is not improper to pay a witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert
witness on terms permitted by law. The common law rule in most jurisdictions is
that it is improper to pay an occurrence witness any fee for testifying and that it is
improper to pay an expert witness a contingent fee.
Id. R. 3.4 cmt.
See, for example, Rule 35(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, which provides:
Reducing a Sentence for Substantial Assistance.
(1) In General. Upon the government’s motion made within one year of
sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the defendant, after sentencing,
provided substantial assistance in investigating or prosecuting another person.
(2) Later Motion. Upon the government’s motion made more than one year after
sentencing, the court may reduce a sentence if the defendant’s substantial
assistance involved:
(A) information not known to the defendant until one year or more after
sentencing;
(B) information provided by the defendant to the government within one
year of sentencing, but which did not become useful to the government until
more than one year after sentencing; or
(C) information the usefulness of which could not reasonably have been
anticipated by the defendant until more than one year after sentencing and
which was promptly provided to the government after its usefulness was
reasonably apparent to the defendant.
FED. R. CRIM. P. 35(b). State rules regulating plea agreements are written into the state rules
of criminal procedure and local court rules. For example, in Pennsylvania, the relevant rule
states:
(B) Plea Agreements.
(1) When counsel for both sides have arrived at a plea agreement, they shall
state on the record in open court, in the presence of the defendant, the terms
of the agreement, unless the judge orders, for good cause shown and with the
consent of the defendant, counsel for the defendant, and the attorney for the
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government can offer to improve the conditions of confinement.3 This
asymmetry is something of a puzzle, for most asymmetries in criminal law
favor the defendant. The asymmetry seems to disappear when physical
evidence is at issue. Both prosecutors and defendants, and even potential
defendants, can within limits encourage the production of physical evidence
with monetary rewards, though of course pieces of evidence (like testimony)
can also be judicially compelled and thus need not be purchased.4 The ability of
even interested defendants to pay for physical evidence is sensible rather than
doubly puzzling if one regards the dangers of bias and false testimony as much
reduced in the case of physical evidence. At the same time, this permissiveness
with respect to one kind of evidence raises the question of why we do not see
more payments (or requests for payment) for things like privately owned
surveillance devices that could generate important evidence.
One goal of this Essay is to develop the idea that a better understanding of
the particular distaste for monetary incentives and of the asymmetry in
favor of the government leads to a conclusion that law could better encourage
the production of evidence. Law’s focus has been on the rules of evidence
gathering in the investigation of crimes and accusations. We suggest
that optimal crime fighting, as well as the preservation of individual rights,
likely involves greater private investment in strategies that are set in motion
before specific crimes are committed. Our positive theorizing about several

3.

4.

Commonwealth, that specific conditions in the agreement be placed on the
record in camera and the record sealed.
(2) The judge shall conduct a separate inquiry of the defendant on the record
to determine whether the defendant understands and voluntarily accepts the
terms of the plea agreement on which the guilty plea or plea of nolo contendere
is based.
PA. R. CRIM. P. 590(B). For an example of a local court rule, see MO. 38TH JUD. CIR. CT. R.
67.8. In California, the Judicial Council of California facilitates plea agreements with an
optional, standardized form. See Plea Form, with Explanations and Waiver of Rights—Felony,
CA. CTS. (Jan. 1, 2010), http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/cr101.pdf.
See George C. Harris, Testimony for Sale: The Law and Ethics of Snitches and Experts, 28 PEPP.
L. REV. 1 (2000). As Harris notes:
According to U.S. Sentencing Commission studies, one of every five federal
defendants receives a sentencing reduction for “substantial assistance” to the
government, which is just one form of compensation that prosecutors can offer to
cooperating witnesses. Many more seek such reductions. As observed by one
Assistant United States Attorney, “[i]t is a rare federal case that does not require
the use of criminal witnesses—those who have pleaded guilty to an offense and
are testifying under a plea agreement, or those who are testifying under a grant of
immunity.”
Id. at 1 (footnotes omitted).
See FED. R. CRIM. P. 17(c).

693

the yale law journal

122:690

2012

asymmetries in inducements to produce evidence—monetary/nonmonetary,
prosecution/defense, testimonial/physical—has important implications for the
question of how to encourage the production of evidence and thus the accuracy
of verdicts and the efficient reduction of crime.5 In the process, we offer
a number of explanations for the existing and superficially troubling
asymmetries.6
Part I analyzes the first two asymmetries. We begin with the prohibition on
monetary payments to witnesses, and note the allowances for informants who
are not quite, or not yet, witnesses in court. Private parties and governments
can, for instance, offer rewards for information leading to arrests, and both can
establish rewards for whistleblowers. Payments that facilitate the recovery of
stolen property are also permitted, though these might generate testimonial
evidence. Disallowed payments should be understood in the shadow of
litigants’ power to compel testimony from identifiable witnesses. At the same
time, monetary payments might undermine civic virtue and encourage false
testimony. We suggest that none of these features is as useful an explanatory
device as the idea that monetary payments would often give witnesses
monopoly, or holdout, power.
The discussion then turns to the asymmetry between the prosecution and
the defense. The prosecution’s superior ability to encourage witnesses can be
understood as manifesting the public’s preference for fighting crime and its
indifference to the rights of likely defendants. Moreover, the public is likely to
prefer inexpensive crime fighting, and it thus supports a system that bars
monetary payments but allows plea bargains, which seem costless. The
prosecution/defense asymmetry is a product of this preference. An orthogonal
explanation for the asymmetry begins with the requirement that inducements
to witnesses be disclosed so that their testimony can be properly evaluated. The
prosecution, as a repeat player, is likely more reliable than defendants, though
perhaps no more so than public defenders, in complying with a duty to
disclose; moreover, the benefits the prosecution offers to witnesses are more
5.

6.
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We do not pretend to know the correct tradeoff between hiring more police and installing
surveillance cameras, for example, but our strategy is to understand the hurdles to evidence
gathering embedded in current law, and then to suggest some changes or investments that
are likely to improve the efficiency of evidence gathering and production.
See Ezra Friedman & Eugene Kontorovich, An Economic Analysis of Fact Witness Payment, 3 J.
LEGAL ANALYSIS 139 (2011), which highlights the monopoly power of fact witnesses and
argues for regulated payments rather than zero payments under a kind of liability rule. We
reach a different conclusion, and we point to new problems associated with the present
system’s ban on payments to witnesses. We also explore the asymmetrical bargaining power
of the prosecution and defendant in criminal cases, the choice between early and late
payments to witnesses, and the possibility of unregulated (market) payments for testimony
and physical evidence.
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observable than are those that defendants would offer. A final explanation
regards the government’s ability to plea bargain with potential witnesses as a
means of offsetting the disinclination of many witnesses to be disloyal to their
employers and friends.
Part II turns from the gathering of evidence to its production. We begin
with the apparent distinction between a payment made before particular
testimony is sought and one made ex post, when it is known to concern a
particular accused or to favor one side in a specific criminal case. This
distinction turns out to play an important role in understanding where
monetary payment is permitted. The ex ante/ex post distinction incorporates a
strategy for discouraging false testimony and minimizing the danger that wellplaced witnesses, including experienced inmates and informants, would initiate
crimes in order to profit from them.
The explanations of the monetary/nonmonetary asymmetry do not extend
to physical evidence. It is, for example, more difficult to fabricate a murder
weapon or a damning digital image than it is to provide false testimony.
Moreover, inasmuch as physical evidence is more easily compelled than is
testimonial evidence, there is less of a holdout problem. There remains the
problem of encouraging the production of evidence, and for this, we turn in
part to the law of takings for guidance. It is likely that there is underproduction
of physical evidence, and that judicious payments to those who provide
physical evidence or even some subsidy of individuals’ use of new technologies
would be worthwhile. The Essay concludes with a summary of policy
implications and limitations.
i. limits on inducements to testify
A. The Ban on Payment for Testimony
Criminal laws pertaining to bribery, the rules of evidence, and the rules of
professional responsibility combine to limit payments to witnesses.7 At one end

7.

See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) (2010); see also 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2006)
(prohibiting the bribery of public officials and witnesses); Harris, supra note 3, at 5-12
(2000) (describing the “ethical rules and criminal sanctions regarding compensation to
witnesses”); Jeffrey S. Kinsler & Gary S. Colton, Jr., Compensating Fact Witnesses, 184 F.R.D.
425 (1999) (discussing the permissibility of payment to fact witnesses). For cases applying
rules of professional conduct against paying fact witnesses, see In re Complaint of PMD
Enterprises Inc., 215 F. Supp. 2d 519, 530 (D.N.J. 2002), revoking an attorney’s pro hac vice
admission for, among other things, violating the New Jersey Rules of Professional Conduct
3.4(b), modeled on Rule 3.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct; Golden Door
Jewelry Creations, Inc. v. Lloyds Underwriters Non-Marine Ass’n, 865 F. Supp. 1516 (S.D. Fla.
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of the spectrum, expert witnesses can be paid for their time, and in this manner
earn a return on their training.8 Even run-of-the-mill fact witnesses can
generally be compensated for time and travel.9 But at the other end, no
payment can be conditioned on “the giving of testimony in a certain way,” no
payment can be made to prevent or discourage a witness from testifying, and
none can be contingent on the outcome of the case.10
1994), finding payments to fact witnesses to be a violation of Rule 4-3.4(b) of the Florida
Rules of Professional Conduct, which was modeled on Rule 3.4 of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct; and In re Bruno, 956 So. 2d 577 (La. 2007), applying a Louisiana rule
modeled on Rule 3.4(b) of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct to suspend an
attorney’s license to practice.
8. See Harris, supra note 3, at 34-48 (describing the history and practice of compensating expert
witnesses).
9. Many states are guided by the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct, which establish
that “it is not improper to pay a witness’s expenses or to compensate an expert witness on
terms permitted by law.” See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) cmt. (2010). The
“terms permitted by law” are in turn determined by the federal bribery law, which states
that the prohibitions on paying witnesses
shall not be construed to prohibit the payment or receipt of witness fees provided
by law, or the payment, by the party upon whose behalf a witness is called and
receipt by a witness, of the reasonable cost of travel and subsistence incurred and
the reasonable value of time lost in attendance at any such trial, hearing, or
proceeding, or in the case of expert witnesses, a reasonable fee for time spent in
the preparation of such opinion, and in appearing and testifying.
18 U.S.C. § 201(d); see also John K. Villa, Paying Fact Witnesses, 19 ACCA DOCKET 112, 112
(2001) (“Although the common law rule survives in some jurisdictions, most states have
now modified the rule to permit fact witnesses to be reimbursed for expenses incurred and
compensated for time lost with respect to litigation.” (footnote and citations omitted)
(citing Centennial Mgmt. Servs., Inc. v. AXA Re Vie, 193 F.R.D. 671 (D. Kan. 2000); New
York v. Solvent Chem. Co., 166 F.R.D. 284 (W.D.N.Y. 1996); Kinsler & Colton, supra note
7, at 427-28)).
10. Villa, supra note 9, at 112-13. Villa suggests the following:
Any condition attached to the payments that may be viewed as influencing the
testimony of the witness is suspect. For example, in a case in which payment is (1)
conditioned on the giving of testimony in a certain way, even if conditioned on
“truthful testimony,” (2) is made to prevent the witness’s attendance at trial, or
(3) is contingent to any extent on the outcome of the case, the payment will be
deemed unethical.
Id. at 113 (footnotes omitted); see also 7 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 15:6
(4th ed. 2012) (“[B]argains to obtain testimony for compensation conditional upon success
or to pay for evidence of a certain nature desired for purposes of litigation have been
similarly denounced as contrary to sound public policy. . . . It is just as objectionable to
bargain for the suppression of evidence, by paying witnesses to leave the state . . . as to
bargain for its production; and any bargain having this for its object is invalid.” (footnotes
omitted)).
The claim that no payment can be “conditioned on the giving of testimony in a certain
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One can imagine a legal system permitting payments in order to encourage
fact witnesses, especially if they have reason to be afraid or if the truth to which
they will testify is unpopular.11 But it is plain that most legal systems, and
certainly relevant American law, reflect the view that profit will hazardously
generate falsehoods.12 The nearly universal strategy is to permit both sides to
enlist the help of a court in order to compel witnesses to testify, but not to use
money to encourage unidentifiable witnesses to step forward, to encourage
reluctant witnesses to be more forthcoming, or to encourage the production of
physical evidence that would not otherwise come into being.
However universal this strategy may be, it comes with exceptions, mostly
directed at payments made long before a trial or specific crime takes place.
Thus, one source of exception is the convention, or sporadic practice, of
offering a reward for information leading to the arrest of a perpetrator or to the
return of a stolen item. In the process of collecting the reward, a potential
witness might be identified and in this way, even if eventually compelled to
testify, effectively paid for testimony. At a minimum, rewards for information
rather than testimony could be challenged at trial as part of an objection to the
admissibility of evidence, including a prior approval of an intrusive search. It
is, therefore, somewhat surprising that these rewards do not appear to have
generated litigation when the information encouraged in this manner had an
impact on actual testimony.
The information-testimony connection is not entirely overlooked. A lawyer
in search of an alibi witness would probably not dare post the advertisement:
“I will pay $1,000 for a witness who saw the person pictured below in East Los
Angeles on Friday, the 3rd of March.” But, of course, lawyers and investigators
regularly grease information pathways, so that there are some payments that
lead to testimony. Moreover, the hypothetical advertisement just sketched

way,” Villa, supra note 9, at 113, is somewhat exaggerated. There are situations in which a
plea bargain or other nonmonetary promise is withdrawn because a witness has misled the
prosecution or reversed course about his or her intention to testify. To some degree, the
witness who has bargained must keep one end of the bargain in order to enjoy the other.
Alternatively, the statement in the text can be understood as limited to monetary payments;
this version underreports the interesting fact that even nonmonetary inducements may not
be offered either in return for a promise not to testify or in a manner that depends entirely
on the outcome of a criminal trial.
11. The case for payments, and indeed for payments to witnesses on both sides, in order to
encourage testimony is advanced in Bruce H. Kobayashi & Larry E. Ribstein, The Hypocrisy
of the Milberg Indictment: The Need for a Coherent Framework on Paying for Cooperation in
Litigation, 2 J. BUS. & TECH. L. 369 (2007).
12. See infra Subsection I.B.1. A more cynical theory is that the legal system is designed to
reduce costs so that it capitalizes on the power to compel witnesses and physical evidence
without compensation.
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would be conventional rather than daring if it avoided the word witness and
simply asked for information about its featured subject. It is difficult to obtain
systematic information about related practices, but police surely modify their
investigations when a suspect provides credible information pointing to a new
theory of a crime, and such information can often be developed through
rewards. Still, it seems safe to proceed under the assumption that the world of
criminal trials would look different if payments for testimony were explicitly
permitted. Both sides might wish to offer payments ex post, and the
government (and perhaps insurers) would likely offer payments ex ante in
order to increase the production of evidence.13 Under current law, however,
only some indirect payments to fact witnesses are permitted. Each side can offer
these ex ante rewards for information, but only the government can induce a
witness with a promise to reduce criminal charges or to improve the terms of
confinement.14
Another source of exceptions to the doctrinal claim that neither party may
directly influence fact witnesses with monetary payments is the availability of
rewards to whistleblowers—often labeled as “informants” if paid—whether
because of public law or private law, which is to say statutes or promises. The
private promises might arise out of corporate governance and ethics initiatives,

13.
14.
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See infra Section II.A.
Plea bargains are not quite universal, but it is noteworthy that even some civil law
jurisdictions, such as France and Germany, have come to embrace them, though with a
requirement that the judge be firmly in control of the process. See Maike Frommann,
Regulating Plea Bargaining in Germany: Can the Italian Approach Serve as a Model To
Guarantee the Independence of German Judges?, 5 HANSE L. REV. 197 (2009); Yehonatan
Givati, The Comparative Law and Economics of Plea Bargaining: Theory and Evidence 2 (John
M. Olin Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Bus., Fellows’ Discussion Paper Series, Discussion Paper No.
39, 2011), http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/olin_center/fellows_papers/pdf/Givati
_39.pdf (“In . . . 2004 France introduced a version of guilty pleas and bargaining, but this
new procedure is limited to crimes punishable with no more than five years in prison, and
allows the prosecutor to propose a sentence not exceeding one year in prison.” (citation
omitted)). In some countries, plea arrangements are limited to reductions in time served, so
that once the prosecutor brings charges, they cannot be withdrawn. Of course, this might
simply accelerate the timetable for bargaining because it is hard to force the prosecutor to
bring charges in the first place. Note that the government can also offer a kind of ex ante
plea bargain, in the form of immunity from prosecution. Again, that is a tool only the
government is empowered to wield. Similarly, the government can encourage witnesses by
promising not to deport—or even to help in the quest for legal status and then citizenship—
illegal immigrants who step forward to testify when they are the victims of criminal activity.
See Victims of Criminal Activity: “U” Nonimmigrant Status, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR.
SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov (follow “Victims of Human Trafficking & Other Crimes”
hyperlink; then follow “U Nonimmigrant Status (U Visa)” hyperlink) (last updated Oct. 3,
2011) (explaining the U visa process and the requirement of certification by a law
enforcement authority).
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though in fact these systems rarely offer rewards. Informants who respond to
promised rewards can receive flat payments or calibrated commissions, and
there is obviously some danger of false claims. Moreover, inasmuch as there is
rarely, if ever, a promise of matching compensation for contrary information,
the arrangements are structurally asymmetrical.
When the reward is authorized by statute, there is no legal problem—short
of a constitutional objection—though the asymmetry can be instructive.
Within broad constitutional limits, the government is simply permitted to set
the rules of the game. One example is section 7623 of the U.S. Internal
Revenue Code, which authorizes rewards for information that substantially
leads to the collection of more than two million dollars.15 The whistleblower
receives between fifteen and thirty percent of the amount the Internal Revenue
Service collects.16 There is, of course, no corresponding reward for witnesses
who help a taxpayer defeat a claim by the government and, presumably, no
taxpayer could pay a witness in this manner without violating the norm and
rule against paying for testimony.17 In most cases, the rewarded informant will
not need to testify because the information will have generated an audit and
the government can proceed on its own, but even when testimony is eventually
sought or actually compelled from the informant, the statutory authority
overcomes the more general doctrinal objection to paid testimony.
Another example of an asymmetric scheme is the False Claims Act, which
provides for a civil fine and treble damages for a false claim against the
government—and rewards whistleblowers with fifteen to thirty percent of
these damages.18 There is no payment for testimony per se, but because the
reward is contingent on the government’s recovery, testimony is certainly
encouraged. Again, there is no corresponding reward for testimony in favor of
the defendant, and the defendant can hardly make a large reward contingent
on his acquittal.19 Similarly, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and
Consumer Protection Act encourages testimony regarding corrupt practices by

I.R.C. § 7623 (2006).
Id. § 7623(b)(1).
17. For some discussion of the idea that the government’s reward simply offsets the implicit
reward available, for instance, to the defendant’s loyal employee, see infra text
accompanying notes 44-45.
18. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). This range depends on the government’s discretion, court
approval, and whether the government intervenes and takes control of the litigation. See id.
§ 3730(d)(1)-(2).
19. To be sure, an employee of the defendant, especially well situated to testify against the
defendant, might feel pressure from the employer despite the statute’s protection against
retaliatory action. Id. § 3730(h).
15.

16.
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offering informants ten to thirty percent of imposed monetary sanctions.20
There are no rewards for contrary witnesses.
More generally, legislation can specifically authorize rewards for
information and testimony, and posted rewards are regularly protected by
statute. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct forbid compensation to
fact witnesses absent specific statutory authorization.21 Thus, the law in Illinois
generally forbids payment to witnesses22 but provides exceptions for
informants working for the police or prosecution and for private individuals
who are paid for information leading to the arrest and conviction of specified
offenders.23 Notably, the law provides that a private individual may
compensate another private individual for such information.24 California law
similarly permits compensation to police informants and when rewards are
statutorily authorized for information leading to the arrest and conviction of
specified offenders.25
As already intimated, a court might break new ground and rule that any of
these payments, especially in light of its asymmetric character, violated the
defendant’s due process rights, or somehow amounted to a miscarriage of
justice. On the other hand, absent more specific evidence of bias or fraudulent
testimony, the defendant might as well argue that it was unfair or
unconstitutional that the police who arrested him worked for the government,
while he had no subsidized investigators of his own. Of course, that “claim” is
weakened by the argument that the police do, in fact, look for evidence of
innocence as well as guilt, and that the government is indeed asymmetrically
obliged to turn over evidence that might exculpate a defendant.26 One
asymmetry might offset the other, though we hesitate to deploy such
arguments especially where the starting point involves an asymmetrical burden

20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
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15 U.S.C.A. § 78u-6(a)-(b) (West 2012).
See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 3.4(b) & cmt. 3 (2010).
720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/32-4c(a) (2012).
Id. 5/32-4c(d)(2)-(2.6).
Id. 5/32-4c(d)(2.6).
CAL. PENAL CODE § 132.5(e)(2), (4) (West Supp. 2012).
More generally, there is an argument for asymmetry because the prosecution might be
expected not only to convict the guilty with evidence it gathers but also to exonerate the
innocent. The validity of this argument depends on prosecutors’ aims. See generally Frank H.
Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983)
(suggesting that prosecutors maximize deterrence with the resources at their disposal);
William M. Landes, An Economic Analysis of the Courts, 14 J.L. & ECON. 61 (1971) (modeling
behavior of prosecutors and defendants and considering their resources, length of sentence,
and probability of conviction).
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of proof.27 Still, the offset is incomplete or metaphorical; the government is not
in the habit of promising rewards for information leading to the exoneration of
suspected wrongdoers. There are, however, private-sector whistleblower plans
that are not directly authorized by statute. When these schemes guarantee
confidentiality, an investigator who follows up on information provided by a
whistleblower must develop evidence without the direct participation of the
original informant. If there is an asymmetry here, it is brought about by the
fact that only one “side” will have funded the infrastructure that supports the
reporting system.
Even when whistleblowing systems do offer rewards and lead to voluntary
or compelled testimony, a lawyer could surely argue that there was no direct
payment for testimony. In any event, our purpose here is not to argue that
whistleblowing rewards ought to be exposed and quashed. They surely ought
to be reasonably transparent, in the sense that a criminal defendant is entitled
to know that information used against him might have been encouraged by the
promise of reward, because that might give the defense some clue as to where
to look for evidence of perjury, for the foundation of a claim that the
government deployed an unconstitutional warrant, or simply for the basis of an
argument to a jury that some information it heard may be unreliable.28
A notable feature of all these arrangements—private or public, episodic or
standing (which is to say, occasionally posted rewards as opposed to
longstanding whistleblower arrangements), and even authorized or
spontaneous—is that the more the monetary encouragement is provided ex
ante, well before it is clear whether testimony at trial will be sought, the more it
seems to be legally accepted. Moreover, the ban on payments for specific
testimony is essentially a ban that operates close to the time of trial and thus
pushes payments to earlier time periods. It is not immediately obvious why
this is desirable. Paying someone to come forward and provide information
regarding tax fraud does not present different hazards from those associated
with paying someone who is already identified as having information about a
particular defendant. The distinction, or rationale for different legal treatment,

27.

Thus, plea bargaining for testimony might be acceptable because it offsets a witness’s ability
to invoke the right against self-incrimination. Our intuition is that such a witness is as likely
to help the defense as the prosecution, but the larger point is that there is no shortage of
asymmetries. Our strategy is to identify some that seem puzzling in order to reveal
underlying themes and incentives.
28. It is possible that a defendant never discovers the details of the whistleblowing. But law may
be less concerned where A gives information leading investigators to talk to B or to audit B
than where A directly informs on B. A may have his own motives, but where there is an
independent source for the evidence, less attention is likely paid to the role motives play in
discovering that source.
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might simply be that the more the witness is identifiable, the more he or she
can be compelled, so that there is less need for payment. Moreover, late-intime bargains with identifiable witnesses will often be vulnerable to these
witnesses’ holdout power.29 In contrast, earlier and broader offers create a kind
of competitive market for testimony, where holdouts are less likely. These
observations about the advantages of ex ante offers30 may well explain the
incentives and asymmetries associated with the production and subsequent
gathering of evidence.
B. Monetary Versus Nonmonetary Inducements
The law’s tolerance of one-sided plea bargaining, but not of monetary
inducements on either side, requires careful explanation. The discussion in this
Section begins with the role played by the parties’ power to subpoena, or
compel, witnesses. It considers the danger that compensation will promote
false testimony, and then develops the claim that monetary payments to
witnesses would promote serious holdout problems.
1. The Holdout Problem and Other Dangers
It is plain that the ban on payments, or perhaps ex post payments, but not
on plea bargains with witnesses, requires more of a defense or rationalization.
This is especially so because even though the defendant also enjoys the court’s
power to compel testimony and evidence, that capacity is not a perfect
substitute for the ability to pay. Even if one can compel witnesses known to
have relevant information, the promise of payment might go much further: it
might encourage persons otherwise unknown, and also promote the
production of evidence currently not available. It is possible that some of these
unknown witnesses could be motivated by a legal rule that created an
affirmative obligation to come forward with information and penalized persons
who failed to comply. But even this rule would miss witnesses who did not
know they had information relevant to a given trial (while well-advertised
rewards might find such witnesses) and, in any event, no modern legal system
appears to impose this version of a duty to rescue in systematic fashion. The
discussion in Part II focuses on just such a pool of information, distinguished

This monopoly power figures importantly in Friedman & Kontorovich, supra note 6, as it
does below.
30. Note that by “ex ante” we refer to offers made before a crime occurs. The offer could be for
all material of a certain kind or for testimony in the event of a crime. The payment need not
be made before, or independent of, the commission of a crime.
29.
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by the fact that it is accessible by persons who might not on their own take
control of the relevant information and whom the state does not know to
compel.
A different perspective on the ban on payments emphasizes the perils
associated with payments rather than the likely success of compulsion. One
danger is the loss of civic virtue; the ban on direct monetary inducements has a
great deal in common with the ban on organ sales and military duties. On the
other hand, inasmuch as rewards and other ex ante payments are permitted,
that explanation is a limited one. Another danger is that money will induce
false testimony, so that it must be allowed only in exceptional circumstances.
Thus, experts may be compensated at reasonable, discoverable, professional
rates because it is apparent that if payments were forbidden there would be few
professionals of the kind often needed. Of course, the more confidence we have
in the law of perjury, the more it might be sensible to pay even nonexperts in
order to encourage reluctant witnesses or those who can invest in the
production of evidence. In between is the compromise position, or question, of
why law does not permit payments so long as they are fully disclosed to
adversaries and to the court. An expert’s fee is, for example, fully discoverable,
and either side can suggest or warn that the fee paid to the other side’s expert
makes that witness’s opinion less reliable or unbiased. Thus, a wellcompensated psychiatrist who had interviewed fifty defendants and testified at
their respective trials that they were all insane would find that this testimonial
history was admissible as evidence and, then, that the present testimony was
perceived as less reliable than it would be if coming from one who often
declined to support an insanity defense.
The fear that payments to witnesses would encourage false testimony,
undeterred by perjury charges, is exacerbated by the likelihood that
unregulated payments would often be substantial. At the same time, a
requirement that payments to witnesses be fully disclosed is only effective if
undisclosed payments, as well as false testimony, are easily exposed.31 An
acquittal is of great value to a defendant, and sometimes a substantial cost to
the prosecutor, so payments for testimony might be expected to be quite high
31.

The discussion proceeds with the intuition that significant asymmetries can be explained in
part by the difficulty of ensuring that some form of payments for testimony will be
disclosed. The intuition can, interestingly, be turned on its head with the argument that a
ban on payments pushes them underground. See Kobayashi & Ribstein, supra note 11, at 371,
375, 386. The discussion also proceeds on the assumption that perjury would be prosecuted
and that an exception to the double jeopardy protection would apply, as it does in many
jurisdictions, where perjury was found to have brought about a mistaken acquittal. Finally,
note that disclosure is promising only if juries can be counted on to discount testimony in
appropriate fashion, depending on the incentives received by witnesses. Cognitive biases
come into play here, especially because jurors will have little experience in these matters.
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and to invite falsehoods.32 On the other hand, a jury might be quick to doubt
nonexperts who were highly compensated, and, presumably, a high fee will
also signal an adversary to invest more in an attempt to impeach the witness.
The problems with monetary inducements for testimony are not limited to
veracity. Even a truthful fact witness would frequently enjoy monopoly power
and could command a high fee in a free market, especially where there is no
compulsion, because the witness might know that no one else observed an
event or could provide an alibi for the defendant.33 In contrast, there is
normally a modest upper bound on what an expert witness can command
because other experts can be brought in to do such things as interview
defendants and compare laboratory samples. In this respect, the expert is like
the witness who is encouraged ex ante, when there is still a competitive market,
and is bound to testify in the event that he witnesses an event at a price that
was determined beforehand. The legal system, as well as the parties in a given
trial, would be ill-served if witnesses were allowed to extract the monopoly
value of their testimony.34
A common means of dealing with the monopoly power of holdouts is to
allow the government to compel transfers, and so it is unsurprising that the
law of takings offers something of an analogy to the law regulating fact
witnesses. The ability of courts to subpoena testimony and physical evidence is
not unlike the power of government to conscript soldiers or to take property
for public use. In turn, the inability of fact witnesses to extract large payments
can be compared to the inability of a brilliant general to bargain for an

32.

With or without disclosure, there is also the moral hazard that crimes will be encouraged or
even undertaken by those who hope to prosper as witnesses.
33. When the witness is the sole source of information, the analysis can unravel because an
opportunistic “witness” might not bother to encourage a crime but might simply aver that
one did or did not occur in order to get payment from a defendant (or prosecutor).
Inasmuch as such a wrongdoer must fear exposure, we prefer to dwell on witnesses who
might exaggerate or be biased when substantial compensation is available, but who will not
manufacture events out of whole cloth. One who only exaggerates or selectively recalls
events is less likely to be exposed as a perjurer. Note that while the analysis is simpler in
situations where witnesses who are compelled by subpoena feel obliged to cooperate, it can
accommodate settings where the power of compulsion is insufficient to generate
cooperation.
34. See Friedman & Kontorovich, supra note 6, at 139-43 (arguing that the monopoly power of
the fact witness, as opposed to expert witnesses, may justify legal systems, including those
found in the United States, that grant property-rule protection to expert testimony but
compel fact witnesses to testify). Note that the witness has no other potential buyers for the
testimony, so there is a kind of bilateral monopoly. Some witnesses will have gathered the
evidence at low cost, while others may run serious risks. It is therefore difficult to generalize
about the resolution of this bilateral monopoly, if allowed to flourish without any takings or
powers of compulsion.
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extraordinary salary. The analogy is more suggestive than exact. The
government can choose to pay a great deal to acquire private property, and it
can pay high compensation to some individuals whose services it cannot
compel (like doctors or professors in public hospitals and universities). The
property analogy is perhaps the more useful one because the rule that just
compensation need only incorporate pre-takings value prevents the windfalls
and holdouts that are similarly avoided by the government’s ability to compel
fact witnesses. Moreover, because the witness knows that the government
cannot choose to pay handsomely for testimony, there is no point in holding
out. A witness cannot extract the high value of information for a given trial but
can instead receive only the value of the witness’s time in a pre-accusation
world. This takings perspective is illuminating, and developed further in the
next Part, but it should not obscure the reality that neither side can subpoena
or otherwise compel a witness unless it knows of the witness’s existence and,
perhaps, of the information the witness possesses. When neither side knows
whom to compel, it is plausible that a significant reward—though likely less
than the monopolist’s price—will often be necessary to attract the attention of a
potential witness or otherwise produce critical information.
The preceding analysis omitted the government’s ability to plea bargain, as
well as its power to change the terms or length of confinement applicable to a
cooperative witness, and thus pay for testimony with nonmonetary means.
Once these inducements are included, it is apparent that the law of evidence
cannot possibly be described as designed to deny monopoly power. Some
witnesses are obviously able to hold out for monopoly payments in the form of
reduced prison sentences or criminal charges. The inconvenient point is that
the government might offer a generous bargain to a valued witness, even
exacting no punishment for a past crime and relocating the witness, in order to
gain testimony that helps to convict another, perhaps more dangerous,
criminal. When induced in this manner, the witness receives something of
much greater value than the pre-accusation value of his or her time. This
benefit, or windfall, presents a risk of bias and perjury. In turn, the asymmetry
in the parties’ ability to pay for testimony is puzzling. If the risk of false
testimony is substantial, then plea bargains for testimony ought to be
disallowed; if the risk is controlled, then defendants ought to be able to make
nonmonetary or monetary payments as a countermeasure to level the playing
field.35
35.

One can barely imagine a system where plea bargains are used symmetrically. A defendant
could coax a reluctant witness by offering a reduced prison term or even a promise that the
witness will not face some charges, subject to approval, ex ante or ex post, by the presiding
judge. In turn, the judge would be guided by instructions to provide incentives comparable
to what the government had provided other witnesses in the case at hand or, with more
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2. Holdouts and Ex Ante Payments
A nice explanation for the ban on some payments begins with recognition
of the fact that both sides can pay employees who might in the matter of course
take the witness stand. Police officers are paid by the state, though presumably
not for testimony to be given “in a certain way,” and some defendants’
employees might end up testifying in ways that benefit their employers. Some
of these employees might not be hired, or might receive lower salaries, if they
could bargain for extra payments when it became clear that their testimony was
valuable. Law might therefore bar payments in order to prevent any de facto
renegotiation of the original employment contracts. A watchman has no
monopoly or holdout power when hired, but once he has information about a
crime, he will know that he possesses such power and can try to hold out for
additional payment by conveniently suffering from some memory lapse. The
law might overcome this holdout power, perhaps even to the long-run benefit
of potential watchmen as a group, by decreeing that ex post payments are
unenforceable or that testimony fueled by such payments is inadmissible.36 In
short, the rule against direct (ex post) payments preserves, or raises the value
of, ex ante contracts.
This holdout problem may not be serious where the government seeks
testimony because it is a repeat player, able to gain a reputation for refusing to
pay when a witness seeks a windfall.37 We might even say that the prosecutor
can plea bargain for testimony because potential witnesses know that she will
not do so in a manner that undermines ex ante contracts with persons normally
expected to witness crimes. This explanation does not overcome the objection
that the defendant is uncharacteristically disadvantaged by the asymmetric
rule. There is, however, another way to deal with the holdout problem, and it
is most usefully developed in the context of physical rather than testimonial
evidence.38
complexity, in keeping with what the government offered in other criminal cases. The goal
would be to elicit the truth and balance society’s interests in the present case or in all cases.
Such a system would also reduce the relative disadvantage of impoverished defendants.
Indeed, if the rules permitted only nonmonetary inducements, but symmetrically so, they
would be understood as aiming to correct for wealth differentials.
36. This strategy is familiar in other areas of law. A professional athlete having the season of his
life may suddenly complain of ailments while trying to renegotiate his contract in the middle
of the season. In cases of rescue and emergency, contract law simply refuses to enforce
bargains that are negotiated under duress, but in other areas it is difficult to separate
opportunistic and “normal” breaches.
37. Even if the prosecutor’s payments were undisclosed, the prosecutor might decline to pay
much in order to preserve the office budget for other cases.
38. See infra Subsection II.B.1.
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C. Explaining the State’s Asymmetrical Advantage
The asymmetry apparent in the prosecution’s singular ability to
compensate witnesses is the most significant puzzle involving testimony in
criminal trials. Several alternative explanations illuminate the matter. The first
has a democratic, or even public choice, flavor: a majority of citizens and
legislators might be expected to economize on crime-fighting costs, but to be
relatively indifferent regarding defendants’ interests. An unrelated cause of the
prosecution/defense asymmetry may be the difficulty of enforcing a disclosure
requirement on defendants. Finally, there is the straightforward idea that the
prosecutor’s power to compensate may offset the disinclination of many
witnesses to cross swords with defendants.
How should we understand the prosecution/defense asymmetry with
respect to nonmonetary inducements? Potential defendants may welcome plea
bargaining because many will be beneficiaries of that prosecutorial tool, but of
course they would prefer even more a symmetrical system that rewarded
witnesses for the defense.39 Due process could be interpreted to mean that
judges must reward useful witnesses for the defense as much as the
prosecution rewards its witnesses. There is always the simple possibility that
the government is asymmetrically favored in the law of evidence because
voters, legislators, and even courts share the majority’s preference for fighting
crime as well as its disinclination to protect criminal defendants or give them
unnecessary benefits.40 Constitutional constraints battle this preference at
many junctures—most especially with the beyond-a-reasonable-doubt
standard—but where such constraints are relaxed, it is the majority’s
preferences that are reflected in the law, crafted in incremental fashion by
judges and legislators not inclined to enhance the position of the unpopular
minority.
It is plausible that if the prosecutor offered monetary compensation to
witnesses, courts would require that defendants be allowed to do the same. In
contrast, when the prosecutor offers her witnesses in-kind compensation,
including shorter sentences or promises not to prosecute, the same courts may
see those as currencies that they cannot make available to defendants without

39.

Defendants might also welcome a rule, or reverse asymmetry, permitting defendants to pay
fact witnesses after the trial, without any prior promise to pay. The government should
certainly be denied the power to make payments of this kind because, as a repeat player, its
“surprise” payments would amount to a strong signal in future cases. Presumably, ex post
payments by a fraction of defendants, encouraged perhaps by their attorneys, could also be
anticipated, so that payments are banned even when there are no promises. There is,
however, no law on this subject.
40. See Easterbrook, supra note 26 (discussing prosecutors’ multiple possible aims).
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taking on considerable new work. A substantial majority of efficiency-minded
citizens may thus encourage nonmonetary inducements. In any event,
monetary inducements, even if permitted in asymmetrical fashion, require
outright expenditures by the government, while plea bargains generate benefits
for the majority while burdening unidentifiable interests and persons who are
unlikely to organize.41 A required reduction in plea bargaining might bring
about a substitution toward other, more costly crime-fighting techniques, in
order to offset the loss of prosecutorial advantage from plea bargaining. Put
plainly, the majority might like asymmetry in favor of its government, and it
pushes this preference as far as constitutional law allows.42 Courts can justify
the asymmetry by promising transparency, so that the jury is able to discount
induced testimony, and with the argument that the asymmetric power to
encourage witnesses is more than offset by other asymmetries that favor the
defendant.

41.

It is hard to know whether the majority would prefer to use monetary payments if it could
do so asymmetrically. From its perspective, a disadvantage of plea bargaining is that it
might give its agent, the prosecutor, too much discretion.
42. This asymmetry led to the controversial case of United States v. Singleton, 144 F.3d 1343 (10th
Cir. 1998), in which the court held prosecutorial plea bargains impermissible under the
federal antibribery statute, 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) (2006). On rehearing, the court reversed
its decision, see United States v. Singleton, 165 F.3d 1297 (10th Cir. 1999) (en banc), on the
basis that 18 U.S.C. § 201(c)(2) does not apply to agents acting as alter egos of the United
States government. Much of the subsequent literature has focused on the unreliability of
testimony obtained by offering concessions through plea bargains and the resulting
disadvantage to the defendant. See, e.g., Timothy Hollis, An Offer You Can’t Refuse? United
States v. Singleton and the Effects of Witness/Prosecutorial Agreements, 9 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J.
433 (2000). Proposed solutions range from increasing the transparency of plea bargains, so
that juries can better evaluate the reliability of the testimony, to prohibiting plea bargains
due to the asymmetrical power they create. See R. Michael Cassidy, “Soft Words of Hope:”
Giglio, Accomplice Witnesses, and the Problem of Implied Inducements, 98 NW. U. L. REV. 1129
(2004); James W. Haldin, Note, Toward a Level Playing Field: Challenges to Accomplice
Testimony in the Wake of United States v. Singleton, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 515 (2000). In
spite of this controversy, plea bargains remain common practice throughout the United
States, not to mention the world. See Ronald F. Wright, Charging and Plea Bargaining as
Forms of Sentencing Discretion, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF SENTENCING AND
CORRECTIONS 247, 257 (Joan Petersilia & Kevin R. Reitz eds., 2012) (arguing that the U.S.
system relies more heavily than most on negotiations to resolve criminal proceedings); see
also GEORGE FISHER, PLEA BARGAINING’S TRIUMPH: A HISTORY OF PLEA BARGAINING IN
AMERICA (2003) (describing how plea bargaining came to dominate criminal procedure); G.
NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA BARGAINING § 1.01, at 1 (3d ed. 2012) (noting that “approximately
90% of all criminal cases are resolved through plea bargaining”); Stephanos Bibas,
Regulating the Plea-Bargaining Market: From Caveat Emptor to Consumer Protection, 99 CALIF.
L. REV. 1117, 1138 (2011) (“[T]oday, 95 percent of criminal convictions result from guilty
pleas and only 5 percent result from trials. Plea bargaining is no longer a negligible
exception to the norm of trials; it is the norm.” (footnote omitted)).
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A second explanation starts with this point about transparency. If juries
should be aware of compensation paid to witnesses, so that the power to
compensate is accompanied by an obligation to disclose, then it is problematic
if one side cannot be relied upon to disclose. As a repeat player, the government
might more reliably be held to its disclosure obligations. Even when defense
attorneys are repeat players with reputational interests, discipline is not easily
imposed because law will not disadvantage a particular defendant when his
attorney’s misbehavior in a previous case comes to light. Moreover, the
benefits normally traded by the government in order to gain testimony,
including improved terms of confinement and agreements not to prosecute, are
more observable than cash.43 On the other hand, a promise to prosecute on
some charges and not others—and a failure to disclose such a bargain—will
sometimes be difficult to observe. More generally, a prosecutor who wants to
keep her inducements secret can hide behind her discretionary power to
prosecute or not; even witnesses already in confinement can be rewarded by
parole boards for their good behavior in ways not fully transparent to
defendants against whom these parolees testify. Despite these blind spots in
observing prosecutors’ inducements, it is yet more difficult to police disclosure
by defendants, who have great incentive to take risks and who might be
protected by the double jeopardy rule. It is arguable that the ban on monetary
payments and the prosecution/defense asymmetry follow from this difficulty.
A more interesting twist, and a third possible understanding of the
asymmetry, is that it offsets a subtle advantage enjoyed by defendants in the
competition for witnesses. There are cases where the problem is not that
witnesses do not know they are needed, and cannot be compelled, but rather
that self-interest or other loyalties keep them away. In cases ranging from
everyday tax fraud to large-scale criminal enterprises, employees might decline
to come forward because their well-being depends on the continued success of
the very employers who are the targets of criminal prosecution. In some cases
the payments will seem close to explicit, as when a defendant’s associate is
promoted or favored with a profitable contract on the heels of an acquittal or in
circumstances where the government’s prosecutorial effort was thwarted. In
other cases, there is simply an ongoing arrangement of sorts and the parties are
bound by mutual self-interest or, more romantically, by notions of loyalty to
clan and a cultural norm against “snitching.”44 The government is of course
43.

To be sure, prosecutors can offer benefits, including monetary ones, and attempt to hide
these from the court. See In re Howes, 39 A.3d 1 (D.C. 2012) (examining the use of vouchers
as a substitute for illicit cash payments).
44. This norm might itself have an efficiency explanation, though it might also be a blunt
instrument that is refined by the rules discussed here. See Saul Levmore, Informants, Barn
Burning, and the Public Interest: Loyalty in Law, Literature, and Manly Endeavors (Feb. 16, 2012)
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free to argue in court that testimony is tainted or unavailable to it because of
such strong ties, but connections of this kind can stand in the way of many
criminal cases. For every trial where the government succeeds because juries
are swayed and impressed by witnesses who are willing to turn on their
employers (or families and neighbors), there must be many more where some
combination of loyalty and self-interest disadvantages the government. Put
differently, it is easy to imagine witnesses lying or remaining silent in support
of those whom they know, but it is much harder to think of cases where
citizens will fabricate or remain silent in order to further a case made by their
government.45 Loyalty to one’s government or larger community rarely
involves false testimony or silence in its courts.
This fact, if it can be called that, would be the basis of a powerful if not
more obvious positive theory if the government could bargain with
nonmonetary inducements only when dealing with witnesses currently
themselves in confinement or called to testify against their employers or family
members. It would be especially easy to spin a story in which the carrots and
sticks found inside prison walls required the government to be equipped with
some means of payment that leveled the playing field and made it possible to
gain truthful testimony from persons in prisons. As it is, the explanation is
more intuitive than rigorous. The version of this explanation that works best
might begin with the idea that the apparent asymmetry offsets the widespread
taboo against providing information that harms one’s close associates or
peers.46 It continues with the argument that the rule serves, albeit
overinclusively, to compensate fact witnesses who can expect to lose money or
status when they testify in a way likely to harm their employers or comparable
parties. This explanation, like the others before it, requires an additional step in
order to explain why the offset cannot be in the form of cash. The government
could, after all, be allowed to pay for an employee’s testimony against her
employer, subject perhaps to a disclosure requirement and a court’s approval of
the payment. Again, the argument must be that once monetary payments were
(unpublished manuscript), http://www.law.uchicago.edu/files/files/Informantslitmay9.pdf.
45. These cases might be limited to those where witnesses are eager to see an enemy convicted.
46. Indeed, the taboo and social stigma against providing information to the police and
prosecution are so intense that a body of literature describes plea bargains as a form of
punishment that potentially justifies a reduced sentence. See Michael A. Simons, Retribution
for Rats: Cooperation, Punishment, and Atonement, 56 VAND. L. REV. 1, 26-33 (2003)
(describing the loss of social capital and risk of harm to cooperators); see also HERMAN, supra
note 42, at 76 (identifying defendants’ potential reluctance to cooperate “because of the low
esteem associated with being a ‘snitch,’ or out of fear of incurring bodily harm”); Richard C.
Donnelly, Judicial Control of Informants, Spies, Stool Pigeons, and Agent Provocateurs, 60 YALE
L.J. 1091, 1093 (1951) (noting that cooperators “have been generally regarded with aversion
and nauseous disdain”).
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allowed to one side, they would be allowed to the other, and justice would not
be served—or the majority’s interests not advanced.47
ii. payments for evidence production
We turn now to the possibility that witnesses, or simply persons, be paid to
produce physical evidence, including material gathered on privately held
cameras and phones. We speculate that modern technology has improved the
quality and quantity of useful physical evidence, but that conventional practices
do too little to encourage the production of this evidence. Our discussion
returns to the distinction between ex ante and ex post payments, and argues for
ex ante (monetary) investments by the state in a quest for physical evidence,
but not for the production of testimony.
A. Ex Ante and Ex Post Payments
There is no asymmetry in the government’s favor when the payments long
precede the testimony. Either side can offer a reward for information leading to
the arrest of a perpetrator.48 And, plainly, a storekeeper is free to pay a security
guard, much as the government is expected to pay its police officers, even
though the employee is likely to be called upon to testify at some later trial—
albeit one that is unlikely to find the storekeeper in the role of defendant. No
court would bar the later testimony against a shoplifter simply because the
witness had been paid in advance by the victimized storekeeper or the state. It
is not simply that the employer had nontestimonial aims. For example, a
criminal suspect can pay a lawyer or other person to be present when the police
conduct a search, though that person might later be called as a witness.

47.

The asymmetries explored here might be explained without reference to the idea of equal
treatment of the adversaries. Perhaps a witness who turns on an accomplice deserves a
lighter sentence because his cooperation with the government makes him less blameworthy.
See Aaron J. Rappaport, Rationalizing the Commission: The Philosophical Premises of the U.S.
Sentencing Guidelines, 52 EMORY L.J. 557, 575 (2003) (“Under a character-based theory, a
defendant who provides assistance to the government would be considered to have
performed a ‘good deed’—one that warrants commendation. That commendation should be
weighed against the criminal culpability, mitigating the offender’s punishment.”). But a
theory built on notions of just deserts would also justify rewards for truthful witnesses on
behalf of the defense.
48. There does not appear to be any law preventing testimony at trial where the testimony
would not have been available had there not been a much earlier reward. Nor does there
seem to be law governing inducements offered closer to the time of testimony. If in the
midst of trial one side posted a reward for an alibi witness or a missing weapon, it is unclear
whether current rules would sanction the payment, the offer, or the resulting evidence.
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Similarly, a civil rights worker or a candidate for political office can pay
someone to be an observer, though it is plain that if testimony is later required,
it will almost surely be given “in a certain way.” It appears that great latitude is
afforded payments of money promised in advance of an unfolded story, so long
as they are not conditioned on particular testimony, while ex post money
payments are severely constrained.49 Witnesses of this kind might lose their
jobs if their employers find them uncooperative when the time comes to testify,
but it is likely that the pressure to give untrue testimony is reduced when the
compensation is set in advance and not tied to particular testimony. For this
reason, and simply because efficient employment contracts may be encouraged
at the margin by the possibility that the employee will “work” as a witness, ex
ante investments in future witnesses are welcome.
The government’s hiring of police officers is comfortably included in the
preceding analysis, but the reasoning does not extend to informants. More
generally, ex ante arrangements are not necessarily superior to ex post
payments for testimony. The police might pay a well-placed source to call a
contact on the police force when a person of interest arrives at a location, but
that information triggers police action rather than forms the core of useful
testimony. “Follow E around and we will pay you $500 if and when you are
able to tell us and, if necessary, testify that you saw E sell drugs” comes closer
to prohibited inducement, and is certainly so if the payment is not for the
surveillance information but for the actual testimony. Indeed, it seems more
likely that such an offer would induce false testimony or encourage more crime
than one structured as “[w]e suspect E sold drugs last week; we will pay you
$500 if you are able to testify that you observed such a transaction.” The same
is likely true for nonmonetary payments, if monetary inducements are to be
ruled out because they cannot be permitted for the defense, and because such

49.
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It is clear that ex ante payments are both more acceptable and more likely to be successful
than ex post payments. The observer might be paid in advance but might not easily be
solicited after the fact. On the other hand, it is doubtful that testimony would be accepted
from a witness who had been told one year earlier “I promise to pay you $1,000 if during
this next year you testify for me in a trial in which I seek damages for a tort.” That offer is ex
ante but overtly conditioned and particular even though the alleged tort has not yet taken
place. Note that the example pertains to a civil dispute, where the rule against payments also
applies.
It is tempting to advance the idea that payment is more acceptable when it is part of a
package in which the potential witness is assigned other tasks along with the possibility that
he will one day offer testimony. A police officer, as well as the civil rights intern, does more
than wait around to be a witness, and this somehow makes the payment less objectionable.
There are situations where the bundling is more efficient, but there are also contexts where
specialization is efficient, and we hesitate to place too much weight on this feature of
selected ex ante payments.
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blatant asymmetry would run afoul of constitutional protections. An offer
made to an inmate, F, that “if a guard is ever attacked in this prison, we will
reduce your prison sentence if you tell us who did it, and then testify
accordingly” seems quite capable of generating false testimony and
dangerously likely to increase the number of attacks on guards. It is probably
worse than more ex post inducements, such as “[w]e will reduce your sentence
if you testify that last week’s attack on Guard X was undertaken by Y,” or
“[w]e will reduce your sentence if you identify the person who attacked X last
week.”
There are, to be sure, many variations on this theme, and it seems unlikely
that we can reach many firm conclusions about the relative desirability of ex
ante and ex post promises and payments with respect to testimony. There are
two good reasons not to bind the permissibility of payments for testimony to
the timing of the inducements. The first is that timing does not matter if we
assume hyper-rationality. In the prison case, for example, a strategic inmate, F,
might behave identically whether the government’s offer is ex ante or ex post,
because F will anticipate the ex post offer. If this putative witness knows that
the government will likely offer a reduction in time served or other benefit in
order to find the person who attacked a guard, it does not matter whether the
government waits to make the offer or posts it long in advance of any attack.
Second, the benefit of an ex ante offer seems to be that it avoids making
payment for specific testimony “given in a certain way.” But it is plausible that
there is a greater moral hazard when the payment is for uncertain testimony
than when it is for testimony about a particular wrongdoer or specific victim.
There is, after all, more opportunity for an opportunistic witness to bring
about an attack on some guard or by some inmate than to generate an attack on a
named guard or by an identified inmate. It is likely that specificity generates
bias, inasmuch as the government can pay but the defendant cannot, while
generality increases moral hazard. We ought not, therefore, make a broad claim
about what the law prefers or ought to prefer with respect to the timing of
inducements, at least concerning testimony.
Where physical evidence is concerned, ex ante payments come with the
advantage of limiting defendants’ ability to sort and misrepresent evidence.
Consider a case in which a defendant proffers a photograph as evidence. The
defense might have sorted through many images from one source and selected
the one most favorable to it, even if it is highly misleading. Arguably, the
defense need not turn over the other images because it is does not intend to use
them at trial.50 If law wanted to limit misleading evidence, it is not obvious

50.

See FED. R. CRIM. P. 16(b)(1)(A) (requiring disclosure by the defendant if the defendant has
used Rule 16 to gain information from the government and the defendant has an “item . . .
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what remedy it could use to force full disclosure of the set from which the
defendant selected evidence, but we might understand a preference for advance
payments as pushing in the right direction. Thus, if the photographs available
to the defendant came from a camera installed at the government’s behest in a
public place, then the defendant’s sort-and-select strategy could be undone by
the prosecutor’s ability to look at the other (now relevant) photographs
produced by this camera and others near it.51
B. Regulated Payments for Physical Evidence
1. The Need for Greater Rewards
As a doctrinal matter, physical evidence differs from testimonial evidence
because there is no blanket prohibition on payment for physical evidence.
Physical evidence—and here we refer both to objects (such as weapons, diaries,
and automobiles) and to data (including DNA, recordings, and the contents of
a computer’s hard drive)—can surely be fabricated, but apparently the intuition
is that critical evidence subject to a chain of control, or otherwise tested, is less
corruptible than are fact witnesses.52 Most physical evidence will be compelled
by subpoena or will otherwise be in the possession of the police. The point of
payment must be to bring forward evidence that will otherwise be
undiscovered, either because it is in the hands of an owner who is unaware of

within the defendant’s possession, custody, or control; and . . . intends to use the item in the
defendant’s case-in-chief at trial”). Note that the government, asymmetrically, does not
enjoy this ability to sort and select evidence. Rule 16(a)(1)(E) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure requires the government to turn over material under its control if it is
material to preparing the defense, or if it intends to use the item in its case-in-chief at trial or
the item was obtained from or belongs to the defendant. The government would clearly
need to turn over all the photographs. The asymmetry is not on its own puzzling, as it is but
one of many in favor of the accused.
51. Put differently, the more the government has paid for, and has access to, all available data,
the less the defendant can sort and select.
52. The distinction between physical and testimonial evidence, and their relative ease of
fabrication, collapses at the margin. For example, the value of a DNA sample or audio
recording may completely depend on when and where it was taken, so that the physical
evidence depends on testimony about its origin. There is also the case where we have only a
recording of a potential witness’s words. We try, therefore, not to put too much weight on
the categorical distinction, but rather to paint with a broad brush. On the other hand, we do
suggest a change in practice regarding physical evidence and not testimony, but the call is
really for a change where the risk of fabrication is low. See infra Section II.C. To make the
categories yet murkier, when we advance the idea of investing in the production of physical
evidence, we include and even emphasize personal effort, see infra note 57 and accompanying
text, so that the distinction is not between things and people.
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its relevance or because it will not be produced in the first place if its owner is
uncompensated.53
We have seen that payments need to be inspected for moral hazard. If there
is no problem of this kind, then an advance offer for information that later
turns out to be relevant evidence is usually unproblematic, while an ex post
payment for information already known to be favorable to one side in a
particular case is only attractive where it does not generate holdouts or
renegotiations. The government can be expected to take this into account when
making payments, and a good way to understand the power to subpoena is
that it combats the holdout and renegotiation problem. A person who knows
that she controls critical evidence cannot easily hold out because, once she tries
to profit from its existence, the state is entitled (on behalf of either party) to
compel its appearance or transfer with no reward. Of course, the missing
element here is that this power may lead to the underproduction of evidence in
the first place.
Our suggestion that evidence is likely underproduced, and in need of new
inducements, is tied to the reality of technological change. For most of history,
law may simply have reflected the view that witnesses and physical evidence
happen along, and can be compelled when necessary. One way to think about
professional police is that increased wealth or improved mobility, or both, have
made it worthwhile to hire civil servants whose job description has included
protecting, investigating, and witnessing. With the development of a
connected and wireless world, it is plausible that law is ready for another
change because there are more opportunities for investment in evidencegathering devices like cameras and smartphones. New technologies motivate
our thinking about explicit payments for the production of evidence. At the
same time, law may also be ready for enhanced protections of privacy. For
every technology that might be encouraged to produce evidence, there is the
objection or danger that citizens (or the spirit of the Constitution) would
actually prefer to suppress the new intrusions rather than encourage them. We
offer no opinion on this matter, but proceed as if there were agreement simply
to fight crime efficiently, without regard to privacy and related issues. Put
more optimistically, fixed cameras, smartphones, and motivated human
witnesses have the potential to bring about dramatic reductions in police
forces. Constitutional values might be furthered by this reduction and by the
53.

The idea that some information, or evidence, happens to be produced while other
information requires inducement, brings to mind the distinction between information that
one party to a contract knows in the course of things and information that requires legal
protection if it is to be developed. Cf. Anthony T. Kronman, Mistake, Disclosure, Information,
and the Law of Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 9-18 (1978) (distinguishing between deliberately
and casually acquired information).
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likelihood that machines are free of some of the biases that we associate with
humans, and especially with those paid to fight crime.
The next step could be to deploy takings law more aggressively when it
comes to compelled evidence.54 We regard this approach as inadequate, in large
part because even the most liberal form of takings law fails to capture a great
deal of useful information as well as objects that are not in the control of
“owners.”55 We begin with an example that does not implicate new technology
and then move to one that does—with broad consequences. Imagine, first, that
54.

Courts have typically denied compensation for physical evidence under the Takings Clause
since the Supreme Court’s decision in Hurtado v. United States, 410 U.S. 578 (1973). In
Hurtado, the Court held that the government’s compulsion of a person’s time and labor for a
witness appearance is not a constitutional taking because these are civic duties—as opposed
to property taken by the government. Id. at 589. Lower federal courts and state courts
extrapolated from Hurtado, holding that the Takings Clause does not apply to physical
evidence acquired by the government through subpoenas. See Gary Lawson & Guy
Seidman, Taking Notes: Subpoenas and Just Compensation, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1081, 1083-84
(1999) (explaining the expansion of the Hurtado holding to physical evidence in lower
courts). Even if subpoenas for physical evidence were considered government takings, some
argue that just compensation is provided by “implicit in-kind compensation.” See RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 195-215
(1985). Under this theory, the government’s use of evidence is compensated by the
opportunity of the property owner to compel production of evidence from others if the need
arises in the future.
Lawson and Seidman argue that the application of Hurtado to physical evidence and
implicit in-kind compensation is an insufficient justification to deny compensation under
the Takings Clause. In particular, they argue that unlike witness testimony, subpoenaed
physical evidence falls within the Takings Clause under an originalist interpretation of the
Constitution. Lawson & Seidman, supra, at 1097-98 & n.67. They further argue that
although implicit in-kind compensation is justifiable in “normal cases,” there are three
exceptional situations in which further compensation may be required: (1) “[W]here the
target [of the subpoena] can realistically expect significant asymmetries in the application of
the scheme,” (2) “where compliance costs are unusually high because the scope of the
demand is unusually large or complex,” and (3) “where the act of production itself has costs
beyond ordinary compliance costs.” Id. at 1107-11.
55. In principle, takings law could do the job. When a court compels evidence, the owner ought
to be compensated for the transfer, or rental, of the evidence at a level that is calculated to
encourage rather than discourage production. This is more or less the compensation
expected in takings law, where we do not want property owners to shy away from building
and owning factories, for example, in the expectation that these properties might be taken
for a war effort or highway. The government can bargain for a factory or its output, or take
and then pay an amount equal to the pre-taking value to the property owner, but well below
the value to the government. In the case of physical evidence, this standard can be a bit
complicated because the government or defendant might want the evidence for a short
period of time (where, correspondingly, real property might well be regarded as not entirely
taken, and thus not compensated) and some authority will need to be sensitive to the danger
that low or zero compensation will have a negative effect on the production of evidence in
the first place.
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there has been a fatal shooting but that no gun has been located, and that the
gun would likely lead to the conviction (or acquittal) of G. We know that the
police will search for the weapon, but it might be that private citizens are better
at searching or that some citizen, H, has seen a gun but is disinclined to come
forward or does not realize that it is linked to a homicide. H requires
motivation, but H has never owned this property and will not be compensated
by takings law, except with some stretch of an argument that first labels H the
finder of the property and then regards the prior owner as relinquishing a
claim. It is easy to explain law’s disinclination to encourage H with money:
compensation might lead to fabrication (though this is difficult in the case of
guns),56 to false testimony about the event itself or the location of the weapon,
to unnecessary costs because evidence might be withheld when otherwise it
would be compelled, or to a disconcerting advantage for rich defendants. Still,
our normative intuition is that the current nearly-all-or-nothing rule,
fashioned perhaps in the shadow of takings law, goes too far and misses
opportunities to extract critical evidence with little risk of miscarrying justice.
Consider next a case where J records on his smartphone a video that one
side will find extremely useful in a criminal trial. J need not be paid the
$100,000 that the evidence might be worth to the interested party (and there is
the danger that such payments will bias things in favor of well-endowed
defendants), but J needs to be paid enough to make it likely that people will
switch on their smartphones when there is a decent chance of recording useful
evidence. We might have said that compensation needs to be sufficient so as
not to discourage people from buying smartphones in the first place, inasmuch
as they can be taken (for a considerable period of time) by the government in
this hypothetical, but the expected value of that loss seems too low to change
many purchase decisions. Whether or not this is so, the amount of
compensation needed to ensure that smartphones are bought as before and
then turned on (or at least not intentionally turned off) so as to record critical
events seems fairly low. To be sure, smartphones might be discouraged by the
danger that a criminal will injure the owner of an operating smartphone in
order to destroy the means of his conviction. More substantial payment might
be needed to overcome this fear, but that is easily done. Similarly, if private
surveillance cameras are not as ubiquitous as the courts or other regulators
would like, then more compensation might be awarded for useful footage in
order to encourage the purchase and installation of these devices. Takings law

56.

Note that when physical evidence is easier to fabricate, as might be the case for simple
documents, we can rely on judges to find the evidence inadmissible. The distinction is thus
not precisely between testimonial and physical evidence, but between properly admissible
testimony and physical evidence.
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can be understood as aiming to prevent “singling out” by the government and
to promise enough compensation so that efficient investments in property are
not discouraged. In contrast, the task here is to positively encourage
investment in, and more intensive use of, equipment that will generate
evidence.57
2. One Step Forward
It is unlikely that the law of evidence or the rules of criminal procedure
need to be changed in order to generate more physical evidence, because little
stops the parties from paying for it. The problem is that while the power to
compel evidence combats the holdout problem, it likely discourages optimal
investment in evidence production. We have in mind a budget that allows
judges to compensate the owners of physical evidence. An owner or finder who
comes forward with the weapon needed to advance a murder trial, for example,
should expect it to be tested for the danger of fabrication, but should also
expect to be paid by the court if it proves to be authentic.
Other arms of the state might do more in the way of ex ante payments.
Private parties can be paid to install cameras and to turn their smartphones into
tools of evidence production and thus crime prevention. Our intuition is that
the most successful schemes will pay the producers of physical evidence for
results rather than mere efforts, perhaps adding in occasional large rewards.
The first part of this intuition follows from some confidence about the system’s
ability to detect fabrication, and the second part is a reaction to the expectation
that the payments for physical evidence are likely to be low. This is true
whether one is guided by consideration of optimal evidence production or of
budgeting realities and what we can expect of courts or other authorities. We
imagine, for instance, a scheme in which smartphone users are rewarded with a
thirty-cent-per-day reduction in phone-bill charges in return for loading and
leaving active (for at least some number of hours per day) an “app” that
records local sound or video information, assisted perhaps by a camera or
receiver that can be worn around the neck or built into an automobile.
Information might be sent to a storage location where it can be retrieved for
some period of time. This is likely to work best if the information is in the
hands of a third party, or even several such parties who compete to show
consumers that they respect privacy and unlock the information only when it is

57.
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This is in contrast to the proposition advanced in Lawson & Seidman, supra note 54, at 110711, which does not focus on generating and encouraging evidence production, but rather on
the potential violation of the Takings Clause in situations where the evidence is of unusually
high value or is excessively burdensome to produce.
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sought by a court or relevant to a criminal case.58 The prospect of a cost
reduction of one hundred dollars per year for each participant might motivate
the production of evidence—without creating a moral hazard—and might also
be worthwhile from a crime-fighting point of view. But it is easy to imagine a
news story about a criminal violently extracting smartphones prior to a
planned crime or about a smartphone user arrested on the basis of evidence
received from her own phone, causing a large fraction of participants to disable
the app at the cost of the thirty-cent per diem. The way to combat this
volatility, or quirk in human reasoning, may be with another teaser, such as
lottery proceeds or a prize for a provider of evidence. Smartphone owners will
then enable the evidence-gathering app in the hope of gaining a sizeable
reward.
The case for these payments is strengthened or at least informed by
admiralty law’s strategy with respect to salvage. Salvors are compensated after
the fact, and in proportion to the risk, equipment, and success associated with
the episode. The legal rule tries to create the right incentive for investment in
salvage equipment, and then for the effort suitable to a given emergency.59 The
most important difference between salvors and producers of physical evidence
is that neither courts nor shippers in need of rescue have the power to compel
salvors (for if they did, there would be underinvestment in salvage). But the
similarities are significant, especially when we think that evidence does not
simply happen along but rather is the product of effort.60
C. Distinguishing Regulated Payments for Testimony
The case for payments, whether by courts or administrative agencies, to
encourage witnesses to come forward is much weaker. It is not only that
physical evidence is more readily tested for authenticity than are witnesses, but
also that payments to witnesses can generate bias, destabilize ex ante contracts,
and create moral hazards. These problems seem especially significant with
respect to witnesses whom we can most expect to be motivated by

58.

Note that this information can be retrieved in a way that limits the ability of a party to sort
and select. See supra text accompanying note 51.
59. On the law of salvage and its promotion of optimal rescue efforts, see William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and Other Rescuers: An Economic Study
of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 100-05 (1978).
60. Note that admiralty law can also be seen as sensitive to the holdout problem we have
discussed. In the middle of an emergency, a local rescue vessel will enjoy holdout power,
and overcompensation will lead to overentry and overinvestment in ex ante contracts with
potential salvors. Admiralty law’s solution has been with us for many hundreds of years:
contracts made under stress are unenforced, and ex post compensation is generous.
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inducements. If K is the sort of person who might go outside on a dark night to
monitor a parking lot in the hope of compensation, it is perhaps too likely that
K will allow a crime to occur, and be a witness to it, rather than prevent it or
call police who might serve as uncompensated witnesses. In extreme cases, K
might even encourage the commission of a crime in order to profit from
witnessing it. The most plausible cases for compensation are probably those
presently associated with witness protection programs, but there will also be
cases where payment can overcome the inhibition and financial loss suffered by
one who testifies against an employer or fellow worker. The government’s
ability to provide nonmonetary benefits is rarely of use in these contexts, but
whistleblower rewards do occasionally rise to the occasion. We have seen that
the Internal Revenue Code offers sizeable rewards for information leading to
the collection of very large tax liabilities.61 No doubt law could expand on and
refine that impulse where other testimony is concerned. Payments could be set
after the fact and tied to the risk and investment undertaken by the witness, or
set by formula, published in advance in the manner of tax law. If payments are
made, they should be symmetrically available to witnesses for the defense, for
they too might run risks.
Apart from the hazards already mentioned, payments for fact-witness
testimony present special price-setting problems. It is difficult for an outsider
to know much about the risk a witness runs, the value of a personal
relationship that will be destroyed by perceived betrayal, and, most of all, the
effort invested. All of these variables are easier to assess in the case of physical
evidence. In addition, we can more easily observe the effect of compensation on
such activities as the installation of surveillance cameras62—whose content can
be compelled or simply streamed—than on the willingness of people to notice
and come forward rather than slink away.
There are other problems with payments for testimony. Jurors probably
need to be told about payments, and they might draw the wrong conclusions
from this information.63 Payments offered to a large group are likely to appeal
to the biggest liars in the group, and it is difficult for juries to correct for this

61.

See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
We do not claim that it will be easy to determine the optimal investment in crime reduction.
Presumably, sophisticated comparisons of several jurisdictions will yield information about
the returns from these investments, and then preferences about privacy will be added into a
jurisdiction’s decision.
63. If the jury learns that the government has paid handsomely for testimony from L, it might
think that the police or prosecutor knows that the defendant is a danger to society, and that
the state is therefore willing to pay a high price in order to put the defendant behind bars. In
contrast, if the defendant pays a witness well, the jury might reason that the defendant
believes he or she will otherwise be found guilty—because the defendant is guilty.
62.
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effect or for law always to target offers to small groups.64 These problems are
not so great as to explain the familiar ban on payments, but we do not explore
them further inasmuch as we propose no dramatic change with respect to
payments for testimony.
conclusion
We have undertaken two separate but related tasks in this Essay with
respect to the law surrounding incentives for providing testimonial and
physical evidence. The first is to identify and make sense of the various
asymmetries in the law, beginning with the remarkable ability of the
prosecutor to plea bargain for testimony even as a defendant is barred from
making any significant payments to helpful witnesses. This turns out to be part
of a larger picture involving other asymmetries, as well as a difference between
ex ante and ex post payments.
In the process of developing an understanding of current law and its
asymmetries, we suggested that new technologies have altered the calculation
of costs and benefits so that it is time to experiment with incentives for the
production of evidence. Our second task, then, has been to show how such
incentives might be justified and structured. We have argued that there is a
good case to be made for payments for the production of physical evidence,
including access to data, but that it is too risky to permit payments for
testimony where such inducements are currently barred.
A great many things have been left incomplete or even untouched. We
noted but put to the side the privacy issues that become more important when
64.

If one side seeks an alibi witness and advertises that payment will be made to a witness who
saw the defendant in Los Angeles on a certain date, it is effectively making an offer to a large
group of potential “sellers,” in which there is likely to be at least one crafty opportunist. “We
offer $3,000 to the woman with red hair who can show that she was in Box 107 at a Los
Angeles Dodgers baseball game on June 3” might be a better way of producing an important
witness and not just a good liar, but it would be difficult for courts to supervise this process
or to explain the probabilities to juries.
Courts might also prefer evidence that is not entirely managed by its producer, but
again this is difficult to legislate or supervise. “I did not personally see the murder, but pay
me and I will tell you the name of the waiter who saw it” seems better than “[p]ay me and I
will tell you who murdered Jack.” It is not much better, because the paid informer and the
waiter can collude, and there remains a moral hazard. “We have reason to think that you
saw the waiter run out of the restaurant on Monday, and we want the name of that waiter”
is better still, because it targets the informer and lessens the possibility that the payment will
simply encourage the biggest liar in the group. More generally, there is a case to be made for
treating payments to witnesses who simply identify other witnesses as more like payments
for physical evidence than as witness payments. We do not pursue this argument because
such payments will usually be made to informants who do not themselves testify.
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surveillance and other forms of evidence production are encouraged. With this
important issue sidelined, there is no point in developing a more precise
proposal for payments for the production of evidence. We have simply
suggested what such a system might look like and why it might be sensible.
Another looming question is the relevance of the analysis to civil trials. In
some ways the questions are less interesting where civil litigation is concerned,
because there is no plea bargaining in the picture and often no government (or
other repeat player) on one side. On the other hand, the law is more likely to
allow experiments with payments where a defendant’s liberty is not at stake or,
perhaps, where the adversaries agree to permit payments. We leave these
questions for another effort.
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